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Studies on the diffusion of practices provide valuable insights into how organisations adopt, 
adapt, sustain and abandon practices over time. However, few studies focus on how 
stigmatised practices diffuse and persist, even when they risk tainting the adopters. To address 
this issue and understand how firms manage stigmatized practices, we study U.S. 
organisations associated with the practice of competitive intelligence (CI) between 1985 and 
2012. CI includes legitimate information gathering practices that are sometimes also 
associated with infringements and espionage. Our findings suggest that CI became highly 
diffused and persisted despite the risk of stigmatising its adopters. We identified three factors 
to explain CI’s persistence: 1) keeping it opaque to avoid the negative effects of 
stigmatisation, 2) “constructing” usefulness to justify its ongoing use by leveraging accepted 
beliefs and invoking fear of unilateral abandonment and 3) adapting it by developing multiple 
versions to increase its zone of acceptability. These three factors contribute to practice 
persistence by allowing firms to dilute the potential stigma from use of the practice. Our 
contribution lies in explaining the adoption, diffusion and ongoing use of a stigmatised 
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INTRODUCTION 
Practices such as golden parachutes for CEOs of failing banks and executive bonuses are now 
widely criticised, but endure and are even supported by taxpayers’ money to keep banks 
solvent. While abundant research has examined how controversial industries arise (Baum and 
McGahan, 2013; Humphreys, 2010) and polemic practices diffuse (Briscoe and Murphy, 
2012; Davis and Greve, 1997), scant research has addressed their persistence (Colyvas and 
Jonsson, 2011). For practices to persist they need to be perceived as either adding technical or 
social value; they “do good” or “look good” (Kennedy and Fiss, 2009). Some widely diffused 
and clearly legitimate practices, such as advertising, consulting, and external hiring persist in 
light of perceived commercial gains, even if sometimes questionable (e.g., Bidwell, 2011; 
Sturdy, 2011; Verhoef and Leeflang, 2009). Some legal practices, such as downsizing 
(Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001), golden parachutes (Fiss, Kennedy and Davis, 2012), and 
retiree benefit cuts (Briscoe and Murphy, 2012) persist because of commercial benefits, even 
if they do not look good. Illegal practices such as deceptive accounting, price-fixing, 
environmental degradation (Greve, Palmer and Pozner, 2010), sweatshop labour (Lamin and 
Zaheer, 2012), bribery (Martin et al., 2007), paying protection money (Vaccaro and Palazzo, 
2014) and modern day slavery (Crane, 2013) put adopters at risk of stigma (Jonsson, Greve 
and Fujiwara-Greve, 2009), but continue because of commercial gains, even if these gains 
need to be hidden. It is worth exploring how and why risky stigmatised practices persist when 
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their benefits cannot be overtly acknowledged or made publicly visible. 
A prominent exemplar of a stigmatised practice that persists is competitive intelligence 
(CI). Based on the assumption that “high-quality intelligence is, on balance, desirable” 
(Wilensky, 1967: xi), CI refers to legal practices of gathering market information that have 
sometimes been associated with legal infringements and espionage (e.g., Calof and Wright, 
2008). Nearly every major firm has a CI office designed to gather market information and/or 
to discover the “trade secrets of competitors.” CI practitioners operate in virtually every form 
of enterprise, including non-profits (Nasheri, 2005: 9; King and Bravin, 2000a). CI has 
diffusedi and persists, despite patchy evidence of competitive gainsii (Richardson and 
Luchsinger, 2007; Saayman et al., 2008) and reputational risk from its illegal deployment 
(espionage).  
Given limited research on stigmatised practices (cf., Crane, 2005; Hemphill, 2002), we 
examine how CI has evolved, diffused and persisted. We identify three factors to explain CI’s 
persistence. First, keeping a practice opaque may allow a stigmatised practice to persist. Due 
to reputational and financial risks, users justify keeping CI “under the radar.” Second, since 
adopters and other stakeholders cannot overtly show performance benefits to justify utility 
and ongoing use, they construct usefulness by leveraging accepted beliefs or “endoxa,” 
(Green, Li and Nohria, 2009, p. 14; Wilensky, 1967), and by invoking fear about the risks of 
unilateral abandonment. Third, they adapt the practice by developing multiple versions, 
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thereby increasing the “zone of acceptability.”  These three factors contribute to practice 
persistence by allowing firms to dilute the potential stigma from using the practice. 
We contribute to the literature on controversial practices in three ways. First, while much 
research has focused on the diffusion of practices, we extend the limited number of studies on 
practice persistence (Colyvas and Jonsson, 2011; Zhu and Westphal, 2011). Second, we 
explain the diffusion and persistence of stigmatised practices whose commercial benefits need 
to be actively kept opaque to avoid reputational risks and how firms justify its ongoing use 
beyond just rhetorical defence (e.g., Carberry and King, 2012; Elsbach and Sutton, 1992). 
Third, we shed light on a practice associated with intelligence studies that has received scant 
attention in organisation theory, despite absorbing considerable resources without overt 
benefits (Grey, 2009).  
THEORETICAL MOTIVATIONS 
In explaining practice adoption and persistence, scholars have moved beyond conceptualising 
institutional and technical forces of adoption as separate and distinct (Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 
2010; Greve, 1995; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Westphal, Gulati and Shortell, 1997) by 
emphasising the social embeddedness of technical factors (e.g., Kennedy and Fiss, 2009; 
Lounsbury, 2007). Once practices diffuse organisations seek either technical or social 
benefits, if not both, accruing from continued implementation. At times, practices persist 
despite questionable technical benefits (e.g., Abrahamson, 1991); the accounting practice of 
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managing gross margins in agriculture persists because it is simple, popular, and largely 
unchallenged even by those in the know (Jack, 2005). Similarly, Soin and Huber (2012) show 
how a meta-form of financial regulation has persisted over time in UK retail financial services 
despite lacking systematic evidence of benefits. 
At times, new controversial practices may diffuse and persist despite social disapproval 
because organisations strategize to deflect criticism or defend against potential stigmatisation 
(Desai, 2011). Practices may also persist because organisations proclaim to engage in 
legitimate versions of the practice, or dissociate themselves from scandal-prone firms. An 
example is mixed martial arts, where practitioners have distanced themselves from more 
extreme versions of the practice (Helms and Patterson, 2014). Similarly, firms in the arms 
industry straddle multiple categories to dilute their association with the stigmatized category 
(Vergne, 2012). Organisations may also be able to “insulate” themselves from institutional 
pressures against controversial practices, which explains why modern day slavery still persists 
(Crane, 2013).  
Clearly, stigmatised practice may continue because adopters are attracted by commercial 
gains, such as cheap labour in the case of modern day slavery, or lucrative loyal fans in the 
case of violent sports. Yet, the degree of stigma varies. In the case of violent sports, 
commercial gains can be made public, but for modern day slavery, these gains need to be kept 
hidden. The literature on impression management , i.e., “tactics designed to affect the 
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perceptions of the image, identity, or reputation of an organization” (Elsbach, 2006, p. xvii), 
offers insights into rhetorical strategies (e.g., Elsbach & Sutton, 1992), defensive mechanisms 
(Carberry and King, 2012; Desai, 2011), and the use of dominant positions in a field to 
dampen criticism and deflect stigmatisation (Jonsson and Buhr, 2011). However, we still need 
to learn more about how firms defend their ongoing use of stigmatised practices whose 
benefits need to be kept subliminal and how they find ways to manage the potential stigma 
that may arise from engaging in these practices. 
COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE: GATHERING INFORMATION OR SPYING? 
Over the last two decades, CI has diffused dramatically (Green, 1998; Javers, 2010; Rogers 
and Ruppersberger, 2012; Teitelbaum, 1992). See Appendix 1 for quotes from media 
references on CI and its widespread use. CI is defined as “the collection of information, 
internal, external and from competitors, but also from customers, suppliers, technologies, 
environments, and potential business to provide early warning and help to predict the moves 
of competitors, customers, and governments” (Calof and Wright, 2008: 723; Gilad, 1996). All 
professional activities to gather digital and non-digital information are subsumed under CI 
(SCIP, 2013; Bose 2008) that is associated with a range of practices (e.g., Fair, 1966; Hirsch 
and Levin, 1999) spanning from legal gathering of market information to infringements of the 
law and corporate spying (Nasheri, 2005).  
Investigating rivals and industrial espionage is clearly not the same thing. While “CI is 
 8 
gathering information on rivals through legitimate means, such as published data and 
interviews” (Curtis, 2001: 28), open source data (Fleisher, 2008; Pikas, 2005), “text mining, 
web mining and visualisation-based CI tools” (Bose, 2008: 510), “[s]pying is the grubby 
business of spying, bin-sifting and office-bugging, often illegal and always unethical” (Curtis, 
2001: 28). “Techniques range from quizzing the company’s employees and benchmarking a 
competitor’s products to surfing the Internet, lurking around industry trade shows, and even 
rooting through rivals’ rubbish bins” (Armstrong et al., 2009: 115) and employing “cyber 
sleuths” (The Economist, 2013a).  
Thus, while gathering and analysing strategic information is a legitimate practice, the way 
information is gathered and treated can lead rivals, clients and others to suspect even legal CI 
activities (Cohen, 2013; Dodd, 2013; Holmes, 2013). Using CI can be risky as even a single 
firm’s illegal espionage activities that transgress ethical and legal boundaries can also vilify 
legal CI by other firms (cf., Jonsson et al., 2009). Yet, despite frequent revelations of 
espionage and scandals, information leaks and moles, which further stigmatise CI, the 
practice is seldom evaluated systematically by organisations or society in general. Although 
professional publications often exhort the need for more spending on CI to gain competitive 
advantage (e.g., Choo, 1998; Fuld, 1995; Wilson, 2001), knowledge on CI remains limited 
(e.g., Davison, 2001; Ghoshal and Westney, 1991), anecdotal (Rogers and Ruppersberger, 
2012), specialised (e.g., Hannula and Pirttimaki, 2003), or application oriented (e.g., Nolan, 
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1999; Swartz, 2005).  
Indeed, “in the modern, competitive business world, millions are spent on CI information 
gathering” and “discovering the truth” (Nasheri, 2005: 77) and the “largely hidden industry is 
becoming an integral part of the way companies do business around the world.” Industry 
insiders fear that the intelligence industry “can expect tougher rules” following a rising 
number of scandals and the industry is “just one scandal away from a government crackdown” 
“with so much unsavoury conduct going on” (Javers, 2010: xii).  Yet despite the risks, firms 
continue in engage in both legal and illegal forms of CI. And, even when they gain from its 
legal use, the benefits of CI use often need to be kept well hidden. Thus examining CI 
provides a promising opportunity to analyse how stigmatised practices persist when their 
perceived benefits are difficult to demonstrate. 
METHOD 
CI attracts large investments that are not being accounted for.iii Finding an appropriate setting 
for CI was challenging as detailed information on CI is not included in commonly used 
financial databases such as Thompson One Banker or company publications, such as annual 
reports, which include expenses on R&D and Marketing & Sales but not on CI costs. The 
limitations to access data on CI were partly overcome by using the digitally available public 
record of CI activities and the role of media in exposing deviant firms (Jonsson and Buhr, 
2011; Desai, 2011) to select polar or “extreme cases” (e.g., Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) in 
 10 
terms of a company’s association with CI (See Appendix 2). Seeking large companies with 
media exposure, we formulated our sample from companies that stayed in the Fortune 500 
and the S&P 1200 from 1985 to 2005 (310 companies from 41 industries). We used two main 
data sources. First, as reporting on CI is relatively sparse,iv we conducted a longitudinal 
analysis of archival data on CI use across industries and organisations.  We relied on academic 
papers, annual reports and news releases, papers from regulatory agencies and trade 
associations (e.g., Jones, 2002) and posts on dedicated websites (e.g., www.asis.org). Second, 
we gathered qualitative data mainly from semi-structured interviews lasting 30-90 minutes 
with 14 experienced CI practitioners – providers and clients of CI services including former 
and current CEOs and directors in the companies we selected. Interview transcriptions 
totalled 184 pages. Examples of questions include: “What benefits and downsides of CI do 
you see?” and “Could you describe how investments in CI are justified?” No questions 
alluded to illegal activities but these were noted in informants’ discussions of CI activities. We 
promised confidentiality to encourage cooperation and candour (Glick et al., 1990; Huber and 
Power, 1985). We addressed potential subject bias by employing multiple data sources (Jick, 
1979). Table 1 lists the interviewees and Table 2 lists the case companies.   
--------------Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here -------------------- 
Our case selection process consisted of six steps. First, we analysed how firms competing 
in different industries are associated with CI. We developed a list of keywords to capture the 
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media attention CI received from 1985 to 2005 in the 41 industries to which our companies 
belong. We identified extreme cases in terms of CI association, i.e. mention of CI in industry 
and firm “in order to more easily observe contrasting patterns in the data”. For fair 
comparison, we employed a single source (Wall Street Journal) and used the same set of 
keywords to capture firm data. Second, we analysed how firms in industries with the strongest 
CI association, Business Services and Electronic Equipment, compared with firms with the 
weakest CI association, Fast Moving Consumer Goods. Using the same set of keywords, we 
gained an overview of CI in these industries` firms from 1985 to 2005. Third, our purposeful 
sampling allowed us to choose polar types in which the process of interest is “transparently 
observable” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 537). This led to the selection of four polar organisations in 
each of the two high (total of 8 firms – IBM, Unisys, Intel, Linear Technology, Microsoft, 
Motorola, Oracle, Texas Instruments)  and one low CI industries (total of 2 firms - Unilever 
and Procter & Gamble). Thus in total, we studied ten firms; (Table 2.1, 2.2. 2.3 and 2.4). 
Fourth, using additional key words (e.g., CEO, top management, IT, organisations, and 
procedures) we drew on six data sources to write short company cases on the ten case 
companies covering the period 1985-2012.v  
---------Insert Tables 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 here-------- 
We sought evidence on the evolution of CI and also included primary data on these 
companies. We conducted a cross-case analysis following Gioia et al.’s (2010) approach and 
 12 
identified emerging commonalities (Table 3.1-3.2) along events, actors, practices, processes, 
and structures. Tables 3.1-3.4 summarise the development of CI in the ten organisations from 
the 1980s to 2012
vi
. 
---------Insert Table 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 here-------- 
Fifth, identifying links with CI along events, actors, practices, processes, and structures and 
iterating between data and theory, led to the emergence of five themes from which we 
distilled three factors that contributed to or detracted from persistence (Table 4.1-4.2).  
--------------Insert Table 4.1 and 4.2 about here ---------------- 
CI’s EMERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE 
Using archival and interview data, we tracked the emergence of CI within and across our 
selected organisations, its methods of deployment including centralisation and formalisation, 
and damage control in light of misconduct. We explain how CI emerged, diffused, and 
persisted illustrating the findings with quotes from our interviewees and the media. 
CI’s Emergence and Initial Diffusion Our analysis showed variation in CI’s use across 
industries. Besides being enabled by resource allocation to intelligence functions (Wilensky, 
1967), CI often emerged following crises (Table 2.3-2.4) and a sense of victimisation (Tables 
2.1, 2.3-2.4). After Motorola adopted CI (Table 2.2; 3.1), five firms launched CI initiatives in 
the late 1980s. CI was often adopted based on expected gains despite experiences with often 
illegal CI. Finding allies in media and regulatory bodies, victimised firms challenged CIs 
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legitimacy, only to subsequently engage in it. For example, P&G received $125 million for 
the violation of its rights but later engaged in CI (Table 2.3; 3.1). Similarly, after IBM became 
a victim of espionage, it developed its own CI routines and later turned it into a business line 
(Table 2.1; 3.1). Not engaging in CI was considered “too risky” an IBM expert noted. CI 
practices also emerged from industry recipes shared by organisational leaders. “Why CI? 
Greater minds than I have decided to do it, so I do it.” (Manager 12, Oracle) CI adoption 
ranged from hiring contractors (e.g., Motorola in 2.2) to creating internally dedicated units 
(e.g., IBM in 2.1; 3.1). The boundary between legitimate and illegitimate CI versions was not 
always clear.  
After initial adoption prior to or in the 1980s, the media showed how large organisations 
started using CI, e.g., at IBM (Table 3.1) and Texas Instruments (TI) (Table 3.2), where CI 
first targeted technology, or at Unisys where suppliers became involved (2.4; 3.2). The scale 
and scope of CI practices, as covered by media, appears to gradually increase with its 
perceived inevitability (Table 3.1-3.2). However, media visibility created a dilemma. 
Although it was important to increase CI’s internal visibility for intra-firm knowledge 
sharing, this also increased external visibility that risked company reputation. Across cases, 
the strong involvement of CEOs and top management increase both internal and external 
visibility. Our data indicates widespread adoption of CI by 2000. The emphasis shifted to CI 
as a business opportunity (Table 3.1-3.2). Interviewees noted CI’s diffusion, the use of CI 
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portals, guidelines for acceptable conduct, and opaqueness of the central CI function. 
“…there is a practitioner portal where you can get information. This is a huge pot of 
information. You get all these tools but no-one really tells you what’s best. You have to find 
out on your own.” (Manager 1, IBM) 
“I really have no idea how this portal functions” (Manager 11, Oracle) 
The dilemma becomes apparent when scandals erupt. For example, P&G’s leaders were 
associated with questionable CI activities of one of their service providers. Admitting 
involvement, they agreed to a $10 million settlement to avert court proceedings (Nelson and 
Ellison, 2001). Similarly, Oracle’s CEO was questioned about investigators acting on his 
behalf, whose transgressions were exposed by the media (Hemphill, 2002) (Tables 2.3; 3.1). 
We also found indications of decentralisation, which reduced the internal and external 
visibility of CI at Microsoft (Table 3.1) and Unisys (Table 3.2). However, reducing internal 
visibility limited CI’s usefulness, as intelligence could not be shared freely in the organisation. 
Our CI experts also reported questionable CI activities by external CI providers. 
 “Our partners, let’s say our resellers… are more resourceful in digging up information. 
The quality of that information is sometimes very good, but sometimes it’s also a 
problem.” (Manager 4, IBM) 
 
“If you’re really using insider information for financial gains in the equity market, you can 
get arrested and that’s bad. But I think that corporate espionage is much harder to prove. I 
think some CI activities are valuable and fairly risk free.” (Manager 12, Oracle) 
CI’s Formalisation and Standardisation 
Users and providers across all companies clearly believed in CI’s utility and inevitability in 
keeping rivals at bay with claims like: “It’s important to know…” (Manager 11, Oracle) and 
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“It’s all about the information you have…” (Manager 3, IBM). We find that CI was 
standardised across companies by hiring external professionals, and in some cases, even the 
same main experts. These experts merged consulting and training practices, registered the 
tagline “the gold standard in CI education” (ACI, 2014) and had half of the companies on the 
Fortune 500 list as clients. This reflected CI practitioners’ alignment on the means, goals and 
constraints of CI usage (Tables 2.1-2.4; 3.1-3.2). The diffusion of CI as an “acceptable” 
industry practice in a competitive market tends to largely eliminate differential effects at the 
firm level. One CI expert explained:  
“Basically, we follow who they are, what they do …this is quite critical to us. So we really 
aim for, they call it black on white, hurting [competitor A], [competitor B]… wherever we 
can. Therefore, we want to know where they are, how they sell, how they operate. So, we 
want to find their weak spots, to understand them, to really breathe the oxygen that our 
competitors breathe, and understand what drives them.” (Manager 2, IBM) 
 
“You want to be able to give the ammunition to your sales force…they can email [to a 
specific website] and someone specialised in this specific product area can give them 
support, contents and ammunition.” (Manager 9, Microsoft) 
CI can lead to competitive parity. With every player knowing more about the other, the 
level of transparency in an industry may rise and the value of information for one firm may 
decline (Whitney and Gaisford, 1999). For example, competitors hired the same consultants, 
or each other’s executives (Table 3.1- 3.2) and CI analysts “traded information with 
counterparts in competitor organisations and third-parties” (Jaworski, Macinnis and Kohli, 
2002: 289). CI providers and clients acknowledged these “open secrets”. 
“There are scientific organisations like IEEE, they arrange conferences where people 
present some of their findings. …they all know each other. They went to university 
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together. They know about each other’s work…. It is a fairly small community” (Manager 
7, Intel)                        
An ex-Unilever employee noted that Unilever and P&G – “two of the most advanced users 
of CI” (Curtis, 2001: 29) – engaged in similar CI activities, and frequently reached the same 
conclusions. Similarly, the bitter rivalry among UK’s supermarkets often led to similar tactics. 
“We’d do all the usual stuff, such as sending staff shopping in competitors’ stores, getting 
them to check on promotions, and asking questions to the customer services manager” 
(Curtis, 2001: 29). Standardisation could thus cancel out firm-level differential advantages.  
Transgressions and Reputational Damage from the use of CI 
The practice still remains largely hidden from outsiders and is often revealed through 
scandals. CI clearly carried reputational risks in the companies we examined (Table 3.1-3.2) 
and its legitimacy was openly challenged in courts (Tables 2.1-2.4). After it was revealed that 
the activities of Oracle’s supplier of CI services had engaged in “dumpster diving” (searching 
for information in target’s trash), its reputation and share price suffered (Stone, 2000). In 
many cases, companies continued the practice despite involvement in CI scandals, either as 
perpetrators or victims (e.g., IBM, Microsoft, Oracle, P&G, TI and Unilever). Corporate 
scandals around spying suggest that CI was often seen as illegitimate, and its proponents 
needed to conceal its use, or justify it as “building defences” against intruding rivals 
(Jameson, 2011; Wilson 2001). Our cross-case comparison shows how transgressions often 
marked the beginning of CI engagement, made it appear inevitable and led to further 
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investment in the practice. Our interviewees reported that fierce rivalry justified CI despite the 
risks. The choice is often seen as “binary”.   
“I make sure they lose the game…there’s no second place. You either win or you’re lost.” 
(Manager 12, Oracle)  
  
“You can’t afford not do to this. In my company…you can’t afford not to keep up. It’s very 
tough, very competitive and it’s like a sprint race all the time.” (Manager 10, Motorola) 
Concern for reputational damage was shared by several CI experts: 
“Because [company] is one of the biggest, it’s always among the first to be sued. We’re 
always seen to be liable because we’ve got big pockets.” (Manager 2, IBM) 
 
“We had to pay hefty fines after competition court declared [our company] guilty in the 
past. In order to avoid that, we spend a lot of money trying to avoid getting caught again.” 
(Manager 14, Unilever) 
While scandals reverberated in the media, numerous cases were settled out of court resulting 
in multi-million dollar payments (See Tables 2.1-2.4; 3.1-3.2). Across our cases we find 
considerable consistency in CI victims settling out of court. Firms engaging in CI after 
victimisation knew about the costs suffered by exposed perpetrators of illegal and illegitimate 
CI. Yet they still chose to engage in risky CI activities: 
“There have been quite a few lawsuits between IBM, Microsoft, EMC, and a number of all 
the big players where these sort of legal cases have attracted a lot of publicity. Ultimately 
they’re all settled, in some financial way.” (Manager 10, Motorola) 
 
“Yes, we take some risk. Basically, we think it’s a good story, or we heard it’s good stuff, 
so we fall for it and try it. We set aside a quarter of the budget for some of that stuff, but 
really we never know whether it’s valuable information or not. But it sounds good, so we 
try it.” (Manager 4, IBM) 
Crises and appeals for the right to legitimate defence can lead to further investments to make 
effective and keep legal what in the past has been proven to be risky. 
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“Rather than having problems with our competitors, we spend money to avoid trespassing 
the law. We’re spending more money in training our people not to violate competition law 
than training our people in knowing what our competition is doing … because of potential 
violations, and unfortunately in the past that was the case.” (Manager 14, Unilever)   
Interview findings match press accounts where CI scandals have led to arrests and falls in 
company share prices (Moffett and Pearson, 2011). While admitting to “failings and 
dysfunction” within Renault, the CEO vowed to fight competitive disinformation (The 
Economist, 2011). Even defensive measures to protect company secrets from competitors 
(Javers, 2010) can be seen as intrusive by employees, or suppliers obliged to follow their 
clients’ security rules (Wilensky, 1967) (Tables 2.1-2.4; 3.1.-3.2). When CI is associated with 
moles, spies, and information theft that make headlines, CI’s legitimacy becomes moot.  
Diversification of CI and Damage Control  
The “hidden industry of spies for hire” (Javers, 2010: xi) thrives without much scrutiny 
(e.g., King and Bravin, 2000a; 2000b) through diversification and damage control. Practices 
accepted in some contexts may be seen as suspect in other contexts (Wright and Roy, 1999). 
““Here, let me show you” And you could see his laptop on the screen, and he said “This is 
what we did at my old company”. He had the specs…the recipe of what they had done at 
his previous company. And our guys went “No, no, no, no! Turn it off… you can’t have 
that here. You gotta take it off your computer.…. Delete it. We don’t do that at [company]. 
…we can’t do that here.” That basically set the tone that we aren’t going to allow it. But 
it’s bit of a dilemma, because it’s tempting, right?” (Manager 7, Intel) 
Transgressions are often settled out of court (Tables 2.1-2.4); and by removing the key 
individuals involved (e.g., Table 2.3) to avert public scrutiny. The 1996 Economic Espionage 
Act put firms engaging in CI transgressions at risk of criminal prosecution (Javers, 2010). Ten 
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years later, only a few cases have been brought to court, many involving sting operations by 
the FBI (Nasheri, 2005). Yet, companies continue to engage in risky CI practices.  
EXPLAINING PRACTICE PERSISTENCE 
Our empirical analysis and building on extant theory revealed three factors to explain how 
companies are able to persist with a stigmatised practice. Keeping the practice opaque averts 
or mitigates the negative effects of stigmatisation, constructing usefulness creates positive 
reasons for continuation, and adaptation allows differentiating and legitimating one’s own 
practice version from the stigmatised category. 
Creating opaqueness to conceal use of the practice 
We find that the lack of transparency and observability of CI activities – tried and tested 
mostly in classified use at the national level and among a community of professionalsvii – 
preclude objective assessment (cf., Rogers, 1995) and leads to persistence. CI experts find 
that protecting CI activities requires keeping them secret or opaque.  
“[T]he strategy of protecting our intelligence is to keep it secret as long as possible…And 
then, all of a sudden, we released a new product and…we would say “by the way we’re 
using this technology” and everybody in the industry was kind of surprised. Now they have 
to catch up and that’ll probably take them…even if they can see our [products]… 4 years at 
least to figure out how to do it.” (Manager 7, Intel) 
 
 “[Company] has never hired people from their competitors ....we don’t trust them. They 
could be a double agent. We could hire people from a competitor, train them for four or 
five years, and they could quit and go back to the original competitor and take everything 
with them.” (Manager 6, Intel) 
 
“Our vendors are not allowed to see the recipes on the machines. In many cases, they still 
own the machine but they can’t see what we’re doing to it. So, there’s this balance of “hey 
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we need your help to fix this problem”, but we won’t tell them what we are doing because 
we don’t want them to know. And they will go like: “Well, we can’t fix the problem 
because we don’t know what you are doing.” So, it’s kind of a weird co-ownership of the 
machinery.” (Manager 7, Intel) 
Collectively, the industry seeks to avoid assessment about ongoing use of CI that spreads like 
an “open secret” (Taussig, 1999). CI is not overtly advertised, internally or externally. The 
opaque nature of the practice and its deployment (Dufresne and Offstein, 2008; Jones, 2008) 
impedes external assessment, while the manner of gaining access to hard to obtain strategic 
information also hinders internal assessment. CI often has a low profile in a company, making 
it difficult for organisations to find and utilise CI or to gauge its effectiveness. We found 
different views on the perceived risks and advantages of CI.  
“We get blinded by it… it’s sometimes really time consuming...and maybe we shouldn’t 
spend so much time on it. Also, getting good quality is difficult.” (Manager 2, IBM) 
Respondents also noted keeping only top management informed in the organisation: 
“Usually these reports are only for people in higher levels of the organisation. For me, in 
my business, I know much more than what the CI team knows…but we don’t 
communicate much” (Manager 13, P&G) 
While increasing risks, the use of external CI contractors further decreases transparency, as 
seen in the cases of Oracle/Microsoft and Unilever/P&G (Table 2.2-2.4). A CI expert noted: 
“I don’t know how [contractors] do it all but a lot of it is via the Internet. ... We pay for 
these. I experienced situations, more like, “how did you get this” “this has become illegal”. 
It is really beyond…” (Manager 3, IBM) 
Keeping the practice relatively inconspicuous allows it to diffuse “under the radar”. Hiring 
experts from “secret services” (e.g., IBM, see Tables 3.1-3.2), developing strategic alliances 
with intelligence firms funded by the CIA (e.g., Unisys, see Tables 2.4; 3.2), and using outside 
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contractors (e.g., Oracle), also keep CI invisible, except for those in the know. We failed to 
find transparent accounting and budgeting for the practice (e.g., “We don’t keep track of [CI] 
activities” (Manager 11, Oracle)). It is commonly included in accounts that do not carry 
legitimacy risks such as market research or R&D and thus allows users to claim that CI entails 
relatively low levels of investments. “Mostly it’s part of the marketing budget” (Manager 10, 
Motorola). Companies maintain CI departments and allocate substantial resources to CI 
activities without having to account for it or report associated gains:  
“If a senior executive says “Thou shalt do CI” – well then there’s your return on 
investment, do it or lose your job. The benefits may not be quantifiable but it’s job or no 
job.” (Manager 12, Oracle) 
Through concealed use, an organisation “adopts a practice and actively hides this adoption 
from external players” (Terlaak and Gong, 2008: 855) to 1) build barriers to imitation 2) limit 
reputation damaging leakages and 3) insulate the company against market pressures to report 
commercial gains. Yet resources for keeping the practice “secret” may dwindle as the practice 
diffuses. While diffusion may make concealing more difficult and attaining competitive 
advantage less likely, organisations have a collective interest in keeping the practice opaque.  
“I’m really not comfortable with my inputs on that portal. So, I don’t actually give inputs 
to CI, I use it.” (Manager 11, Oracle)  
 
“Personally, I try to keep that secret, right. It’s an advantage.” (Manager 1, IBM) 
Wilensky (1967) showed how once documents are categorized as classified, the relative 
share of “secret” communication increases. Safeguarding secrets can bestow “specialness” on 
the clique of their guardians (Herman, 1996). As people attribute more value to what is 
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classified, they derive a “higher status” from handling it and being privy to it, and avoid 
divulging details to outsiders. This dynamic may collectively enable persistence.  
Constructing Usefulness of the Practice 
Ideologies, doctrines or beliefs about means and goal appropriateness (Wilensky, 1967) 
strongly influence firms’ CI management. A former CEO of Motorola stated: “Intelligence, in 
my estimation, cannot simply be derived from your traditional business practices” (Galvin, 
1997: 3). Such webs of beliefs or “endoxa” can permit actors to make a virtue out of secrecy 
(Green, Li and Nohria, 2009), and pre-empt challenges or questions. Where CI activities often 
involve retaliatory measures by CI’s victims to “get even”, the practice is still rooted in the 
belief that “hard-to-access” knowledge about what other organisation know, plan and do, is 
potentially useful and valuable information and worth accessing (Costas and Grey, 2014; 
Herman, 1996), despite the risks. Likewise, the conviction that more information reduces 
uncertainty increases the willingness to continue investing in CI (Wilensky, 1967).  
“You have to keep up with your competitors – otherwise you’ll find yourself lagging 
behind new developments. If the industry changes you can find yourself, you know, 4 
years behind; it’s really difficult to catch up…that is a downside, I guess, of NOT doing 
competitive intelligence.” (Manager 7, Intel) 
The perception that all information, not publicly available or disclosed, has to be valuable 
(Costas and Grey, 2011; Dufresne and Offstein, 2008), and thus worth uncovering can precede 
and sustain both legal and illegal CI practices.  
Even if amassing intelligence is shown to be of limited effectiveness (Howard, 2011), our 
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analysis suggests the belief that intelligence is key to staying ahead of rivals remains resilient. 
A respondent noted CI’s historical link to commercial success at Motorola (Table 2.2, 3.2), 
despite CI’s role in preparing Iridium – one of the biggest investment failures in technology 
infrastructure in modern times. Breaking with standard industry practice creates perceived 
risks arising from unilateral abandonment. This dynamic is similar to what is seen in arms 
races (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1996). Just as firms face social pressures to climb 
bandwagons, they also face pressures not to jump off them until a threshold number of firms 
do so, creating “safety in numbers” (Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001). Our analysis also 
revealed the role of fear. In our interviews, CI experts noted that creating fear, uncertainty and 
doubt (FUD) was meant to “hurt” competition. 
“"Find me dirt". We call it battle cards. Battle cards are pieces of collateral we gave to the 
sales force that they could use in competitive situations. ... We would get our sales people 
to tell FUD stories:  fear, uncertainty and doubt. This was a big thing...We had a counter 
FUD....I didn’t have to say anything. I created FUD. That was enough to shift them to my 
side.” (Manager 12, Oracle) 
McKenna (1996) suggests that “entrepreneurs have pervasive fears of being victimised; they 
are continually scanning their environment for something to confirm their suspicions”...If we 
look hard enough there is always, somewhere, some confirmation” (Kets de Vries, 1989: 160-
161). Fear and competitive threats makes it difficult to abandon CI (cf., Kieser, 1997). As 
game theorists e.g., Schelling (2007) argued in the analysis of the outbreak of World War I, 
the fear of being unprepared against a ready adversary greatly diminishes the perceived range 
of effective options (Ahlstrom, Lamond and Ding, 2009). Even the symbolic invocation of 
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fear can reinforce the collective belief to continue with a controversial practice. In the case of 
CI, managers may feel “assaulted by competitive change and fear” that they cannot 
“effectively channel and apply vital intelligence” (Fuld and Borska, 1995: 21). Victims are 
often reluctant to report incidents, as they “hesitate to acknowledge their negligence and do 
not wish to decrease the confidence level of clients or shareholders.” These “fears also explain 
why it is so difficult to find real cases in which organisations are identified” that could clarify 
CI’s consequences (Wright and Roy, 1999: 55). CI victims feel like they have no choice. 
“As a victim of CI you have to be very careful. You can’t label another company as the 
perpetrator without proof. This could have legal consequences.” (Manager 1, IBM)  
By drawing on ideologies and invoking fear, actors can make a virtue out of secrecy. As 
long as these beliefs about usefulness are collectively nurtured within teams, firms, industries, 
or communities, practices rooted in these beliefs can persist. A particular organisation is 
unlikely to discard a highly diffused practice that has become a rationalised myth (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977), even if it risks generating negative stakeholder judgments.  
Adapting the Practice 
Certain practices may persist because they lend themselves to multiple interpretations and 
can be adapted to multiple agendas (Benders and van Veen, 2001). In contrast to more 
contractually formalised practices such as franchising, protected by patents or legal 
stipulations (Godfrey et al., 2012), CI encompasses a broad range of practices, some less 
stigmatised than others. Practices with questionable legitimacy may persist because 
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organisations modify them to increase their zone of acceptability (Ansari et al., 2010), or 
positively position their own legal version of the practice. A CI expert notedviii. 
“I mean as long as it’s legal. [Company] is very strict about following the law whether 
accounting or anywhere else. So, as long as it’s legal, I don’t think that anyone has ever 
been concerned about gathering intelligence. (Manager 6, Intel) 
Transformations in strategic planning at General Electric (GE) to facilitate changes in 
corporate agendas and management styles allowed strategic planning to persist (Ocasio and 
Joseph, 2008). Although CI has reached a high level of standardisation, we identified several 
modifications in its usage which has made it more inclusive and acceptable.  
Our analysis suggested two adaptations that has allowed CI to persist; one to avoid 
legitimacy crises and the other to survive them (cf., Desai, 2011). CI is opaque, which allows 
it to stay under the radar. However, when scandals erupt, the CI community is quick to engage 
in “impression management” and to reemphasise the legitimate aspects of gathering 
intelligence.ix Strong commitment and even direct involvement of top management can 
portray CI as an activity associated with legitimate “knowledge management”.  
Also, the community sides with the press in condemning the few “bad guys”, and shadowy 
contractors involved in CI as belonging to the netherworld of intelligence. Transgressors are 
occasionally made scapegoats and provided as “fodder for the press,” in the words of a 
practitioner (Manager 1, IBM), to distinguish them from CI professionals (Table 2.3). 
Corporations may also try to diffuse criticism by drawing on “institutional endorsements” 
of the practice (Sanders and Tuschke, 2007). These can include endorsements from 
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professional CI societies, and associations based on former employment relationships with the 
national intelligence communityx which, in professionals` media, are widely accepted as 
“forces for good” (Kahaner, 1996) (see e.g., IBM in Tables 2.1-2.4). Endorsements allow CI 
practitioners to distance legitimate “knowledge seeking” from transgressive activities such as 
espionage. Firms may adapt their CI practices in response to public exposure by replacing 
executives (e.g., IBM in Table 2.1; 2.3), developing firm-specific ethical codes, (re) training 
CI professionals (e.g., Unilever, Table 2.4), and outsourcing CI to specialised contractors 
(e.g., Motorola, Table 2.2). All CI experts across firms emphasised the need for law abidance 
and noted that considerable investments were needed to ensure compliance with competition 
laws. Finally, firms adapt organisational structures and the nomenclature used for CI 
practices, such as “FUD” (fear, uncertainty and doubt) (Manager 12, Oracle). Such adaptation 
includes reassigning CI professionals to organisational subunits dedicated to benchmarking, 
knowledge management, data analytics, or more recently, Big Data. This allows firms to 
deflect criticism by showing that CI is no longer conducted in clandestine or intrusive ways. 
Adaptation over time thus contributes to practice persistence. 
Interdependence among the Factors of Persistence 
In conjunction, the factors we identified can allow a stigmatised practice to persist. While 
keeping the practice opaque protects it from probing scrutiny, it may also sustain a web of 
beliefs about its indispensability. Moreover, opaqueness may allow the practice to endure 
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without overt justification or clear evidence of benefits. Contrary to “observability” being a 
driver of diffusion (Rogers, 1995), “concealability” may be pivotal in the diffusion of 
stigmatised practices. By keeping CI hidden, practitioners mitigate both the reputational risks 
from engaging in CI, and the risk of appearing weak and vulnerable as CI victims. CI’s “club” 
shares a sense of privilege (Herman, 1996) and members often agree to out-of-court 
settlements with competitors rather than expose an industry secret.  
“It seems to be a very small networked cadre of people doing this kind of work. And they 
all know each other and move around from one company to another. Almost like 
revolving doors, one builds up quite a network (Manager 8, JLL) 
Even fierce rivals agree on the need to avoid public scrutiny (see out-of-court settlements in 
Tables 3.1-3.2). Yet, efforts to conceal CI are punctuated by scandals. Once dubious practices 
are exposed, swift changes follow, which includes redefining CI in acceptable terms, and 
dissociating clean versions from dubious versions of exposed perpetrators (Table 2.3). 
However, impression management largely represents reactions to favourably influence 
perception especially during and after scandals. The uneasy equilibrium is disrupted only 
when scandals temporarily lift the veil. This occurred for example when: 
“This happened at 2 o’clock in the morning and there weren’t a lot of people around. Some 
of the technicians saw some guy taking down notes while looking at the screen of a 
machine. They didn’t know who it was …It turned out he was from a different vendor. So 
he was gathering information from his competitor. So they chased him out and they found 
him and his note book … He had taken as much data as he could from the screen. ... So, 
that was one of our vendors stealing from one of our other vendors.”” (Manager 7, Intel) 
Keeping CI outside the spotlight avoids close scrutiny of CI’s link with performance. Also, 
setbacks can be attributed to external factors. Dismissing wrongdoers (e.g., scapegoating), (re) 
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training, (re)enforcements of ethical codes and changing the nomenclature allows a practice to 
be distanced from a tainted past and allows it to endure by taking on new forms.  
CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
We explain how and why a stigmatised practice diffuses and persists despite the risks it 
poses for adopters and how firms are able to dilute the potential stigma from its ongoing use. 
CI clearly includes legal information gathering but its association with the “grubby” world of 
spying has arguably tainted the entire CI category. We extend the limited number of studies on 
practice persistence (Colyvas and Jonsson, 2011; Crane, 2013; Zhu and Westphal, 2011) and 
on stigmatised practices (Baum and McGahan, 2013; Briscoe and Murphy, 2012; Desai, 2011; 
Helms and Patterson, 2014) and controversial industries (Humphreys, 2010; Reast et al., 
2013; Vergne, 2012). We show how stigmatised practices persist despite risks and the absence 
of visible performance benefits. While CI can generate commercial gains, engaging in even 
legal forms of the practice pose reputational risks due to CI’s association with illegal use and 
espionage. Yet, organisations may habitually engage in a practice as an end in itself despite 
being aware of the risks (Herman, 1996). By refraining from CI, the powerful would be “bad 
emperors”, as “responsible [emperors] were constantly relying on their networks of...spies to 
find out who was doing his job and who was not” (Fukuyama, 2012: 314). Actors may persist 
with a practice, not just because of perceived benefits, but because of overestimation of the 
extent to which others hold this assumption. This is described by Zhu and Westphal (2011) as 
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“pluralistic ignorance”. We show the importance of constructing an “endoxa” – a web of 
collective beliefs around the utility of a risky practice to justify ongoing use.  
The core value proposition of CI is hard to resist; more information is linked to a 
competitive advantage. The need for more information is in line with the focus on evidence-
based decision making (Rousseau, Manning and Denyer, 2008), and the Big Data movement, 
which offer attractive opportunities for leaving behind the old tainted skin of competitive 
intelligence. Treating Big Data as if lying on the same trajectory of important innovations 
may retrospectively legitimise CI and allow it to assume yet another new and equally opaque 
identity – that of even more encompassing capture and use of data.  
Our study has several implications for both theory and practice.  
Implications 
First, building opaqueness around a stigmatised practice contributes to promoting diffusion 
(Briscoe and Murphy, 2012). Making a stigmatised practice opaque allows users to engage in 
the practice without having to demonstrate its benefits. It may thus shield organisations from 
the scrutiny of audiences and demands for accountability. Thus, while opaqueness is typically 
thought to impede practice diffusion (Rogers, 1995), it can promote the diffusion in the case 
of a stigmatised practice.  
By studying the diffusion and persistence of CI, we shed light on practices that thrive on 
opaqueness. The “burden of secrecy” while working with “top-secret” information (Wilensky, 
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1967: 180), makes it difficult to gauge the effectiveness of intelligence as illustrated in 
estimating Cuban resistance (Schlesinger, 1965). Besides occasional scepticism and notes of 
caution that “all that data can be a bother, an unwise expense” and that “large volumes of data 
present security and reputation risks” (Fitzgerald, 2013), the lack of pressure to prove CI’s 
worth also discourages open debates on its benefits. The diffusion of CI increasingly serves as 
justification to invest in even more CI (Fleisher, 2008). “Over the years, as CI proliferates to 
businesses of varying types and sizes, organisations will have to deal with counter 
intelligence, which is defending company secrets…organisations have to increase and deploy 
appropriate corporate security to safeguard their data from intelligence efforts by other firms.” 
(Bose, 2008: 524)  While CI’s hidden costs are now being subsumed under the costs of 
promoting advanced CI technology, future research can examine the use of mythologised 
practices that consume valuable resources despite unproven benefits (e.g., Steele, 1975) even 
when throwing “good money after bad” (Garland, 1990) may not create value for an 
organisation.  
While CI cannot be directly compared with less controversial practices such as consulting 
and advertising, some of our arguments raise questions about these practices. For example, 
the benefits of relying on consultants to solve organisational issues remains inconclusive (e.g., 
De Burgundy; 1998; Wright, 2009), casting doubts on their added value (Gross and Poor, 
2008; Sturdy, 2011). Similarly, evidence of the benefits of advertising remains mixed, as 
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reflected in the truism by John Wanamaker. “Half the money I spend on advertising is wasted. 
The trouble is I don’t know which half” (Sethuraman, Tellis and Briesch, 2011). It is worth 
examining how and why these practices continue to persist despite unproven benefits. It is 
also worth studying how sponsors of lucrative yet risky practices such as arms trading avoid 
getting scrutinised. 
Second, constructing usefulness may justify ongoing use in the absence of transparency 
and robust measures of performance benefits. Constructing usefulness is often necessary for 
creating legitimacy around novel practices. An example is buying and selling life insurance 
policies that had a stigma from putting a “price” to human life. However, it became legitimate 
once it was associated with concern for family wellbeing (Zelizer, 1978). Similarly trade in 
human organs that is seen to undermine human dignity is justified for saving lives (Anteby, 
2010). However, in the case of stigmatised practices, constructing usefulness is not simply 
about reframing the practice to justify use and promote adoption. Rather, usefulness is 
constructed to justify ongoing engagement even in the absence of clearly demonstrable 
benefits. For example, firms involved in paying commissions (sometimes associated with 
bribery) and unable to show benefits of such practices may construct usefulness by claiming 
defensive or unavoidable use in particular contexts. 
Third, adapting a practice to enable multiple interpretations (Benders and van Veen, 2001) 
can promote diffusion. Firms may purposefully create interpretive ambiguity around a 
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practice to promote a diversity of interpretations (Ansari, Reinecke and Spaan, 2014). 
Adopters may deny or conceal information that associates the organisation with illegal 
versions of the practice while continuing with business as usual (Elsbach, 1994; Lamin and 
Zaheer, 2012), distant themselves from offending versions of the practice (Helms and 
Patterson, 2014), diversify into non-stigmatised industries (Hudson, 2008), or span multiple 
categories to divert attention from their association with a stigmatized category (Vergne, 
2012). Generating greater interpretive flexibility around a stigmatized practice may thus allow 
organisations to persist with the practice. 
While one of the few studies to examine the development of CI within and across firms, 
our sample was dominated by large US firms. Our findings may thus have limited 
transferability for small and medium-sized firms as well as non-US firms. However, as large 
firms attract the most media attention, it allowed us to capture CI information from public 
sources and CI experts connected to these firms. Future studies can examine the factors we 
identified to explain the persistence of other practices and even ideologies, such as 
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Appendix 1: Definition of CI 
Investigating rivals and industrial espionage is clearly not the same thing. Spying is often 
illegal and always unethical; CI gathering is legitimate (Fleisher, 2008; Bose, 2008: 510). The 
1996 Economic Espionage Act clearly made stealing or appropriating proprietary information 
illegal with fines up to $10 million and penalties up to 15 years in prison. CI has grown 
dramatically as more and more companies conduct CI on their competitors (Rogers and 
Ruppersberger, 2012). While such gathering and analysing strategic information is seen to be 
a legitimate practice, and all CI professional activities to gather digital and non-digital 
information are subsumed under CI (SCIP, 2013; Bose 2008), the way information is gathered 
and treated can arouse suspicion. 
 However, the media show how legal CI activities can be confounded with rogue acts that 
may taint CI users (Dodd, 2013). Here, corporate detectives “sniff out the facts”, and 
companies are increasingly hiring corporate-intelligence firms to investigate their rivals (The 
Economist, 2013a), clients (Holmes, 2013), employees (Clark, 2013), and even consumers 
(The Economist, 2013b).  For outsiders and in the media, the boundary between legally 
gathering intelligence on rivals and illegally spying on them through traditional or digital 
means is blurry (Green, 1998; Curtis, 2001; Cohen, 2013; Pikas, 2005; Teitelbaum, 1992) and 
illegal practice remains. “[I]n 1997, there were more than 1,100 documented cases of 
economic espionages related to intellectual property worth over $300 billion” (Carey, 1999: 
112). This can lead to clients and others suspecting even legitimate CI (Holmes, 2013).  
 In the media, some CI professionals reveal that part of the job is “tracking down the 
disgruntled former secretary or bookkeeper who knows where the bodies are buried and 
knowing how to coax information from them” (The Economist, 2013: 7a). “It’s as close as I’ll 
get to playing James Bond without being shot at,” said the president of a firm conducting CI 
for companies (Parker, 2002: 1). “We’ll bug a house, bug cars, put locator devices on 
vehicles, conduct electronic intercepts of e-mails, whatever it takes. …But we won’t break the 
law…wherever we’re operating. Otherwise, the information we collect is useless to our 
clients” because illegally collected evidence is not permitted as evidence in courts and would 
undermine any lawsuit (Javers, 2010: 227-228). 
  Yet, “[t]he most useful information tends to be the most carefully guarded, meaning 
normal channels of corporate intelligence are unlikely to prove fruitful. And if you do it in an 
ethical fashion, you’re simply not going to get the same quality of information as if you do it 
unethically.” (Sorensen, 2004: FP1 Front). A CI consultant noted: “It all comes down to how 
much they are willing to pay. Basically, any type of information can be discovered, given 
enough money, but at times that will go into the illegal aspects. In my experience, a lot of 
people go over the line – they just don’t get caught” (Heavens & Leising, 2001: 4). 
 Therefore, the line between legitimate CI and illegal espionage is clearly not distinct, 
which makes CI a prominent exemplar of a stigmatised practice. 
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Appendix 2: Data Sources 
Gathering data on CI is not easy. We offer four explanations for how we overcame the 
challenge of data access. First, since the fall of the Soviet Union and 9/11, “the covert world 
[has come] under unprecedented public scrutiny” (Todd and Bloch, 2003: I). The release of 
intelligence sources has led to a surge in economic espionage as military allies turned into 
vigorous economic competitors (Whitney and Gaisford, 1999). Second, organisations in the 
modern digital media environment have a “scattered images” problem (Price, Gioia and 
Corley, 2008: 173) and “information shadows” (O’Reilly and Battelle, 2009; The Economist, 
2013b). We reconstructed the scattered data on companies’ activities from disconnected but 
available reports across a variety of media. Third, investigative journalism is flourishing as 
part of media`s role in exposing deviant firms (Jonsson and Buhr, 2011; Desai, 2011). For 
example, novelists tap into and disseminate secrets by “cultivating spies and diplomats, who 
seem to enjoy seeing themselves and their secrets transfigured into pop fiction (with names 
carefully disguised)” and reveal “terror plots, espionage and wars” ahead of the news or even 
the events themselves (Worth, 2013). Fourth, the anthropological notion of “public secrets”, 
i.e., “what is generally known but cannot be articulated” (Taussig, 1999: 6) may apply to CI.  
We identified relevant industries and companies through archival data. We used key terms 
(such as competitive intelligence, competitor intelligence and market intelligence) to capture 
public data on CI practices from databases such as AIB/Inform, Business Source Premier, 
Factiva, Mergent Online and Lexis-Nexis. We chose the period between 1985 and 2005 in 
which data availability was relatively high. We gathered about 28,000 documents that 
contained the words “competitive” and “intelligence” and then eliminated all advertisements. 
To avoid double counts, we focused on 3,978 articles available on ABI/Informs with CI in the 
title. In 1985, six media articles mentioned CI in the title (Figure 1). This rose to 40 articles in 
1997, 165 in 2000, and 472 in 2005. Since 2005, ABI/Inform shows 3,978 articles with CI in 
the title, with peaks in 2008 (672) and in 2011 (661). We compared these results with those 
generated for the same keywords in texts by Google ngrams until 2008, and found them 
supportive of the chosen period’s importance for CI. On this basis, we selected 1985 as the 
start year and 2012 as the end year. We analysed over 3,000 abstracts and articles based on the 
words “competitive intelligence” published online, and in journals, books, and the media to 
gain an overview. 
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Table 1: Interviewees with Managers and CI Experts in Case Companies 
Interviewee 
Number 











1 Business Services Low IBM Provider and 
client  
Entrepreneur, Retail, Business-to-
Business, International Experience 
10+ Middle Management, 
Consulting 
2 Business Services Low IBM Provider and 
client 
Strategy Consulting,  
International Experience 
30+ Middle Management,  
Sales 
3 Business Services Low IBM Client Multiple business units 20+ Middle Management,  
Sales 
4 Business Services Low IBM Client Multiple business units 20+ Middle Management,  
Sales 
9 Business Services Low Microsoft Client Electronics, International Experience 15+ Middle Management,  
Sales 
11 Business Services High Oracle Provider and 
client 
International Experience 15+ Middle Management,  
Sales 
12 Business Services High Oracle Provider and 
client 









High Intel Provider and 
Client 
Functional Experience 10+ Entrepreneur 
5 Electronic 
Equipment 
- IFT Client SME 20+ Managing Director 
10 Electronic 
Equipment 
Low Motorola Provider and 
client 
Business Services, Electronic 
Equipment, Consumer Hardware 
30+ CEO 
13 Fast Moving 
Consumer Goods 
Low Procter & 
Gamble 
Client Fast Moving Consumer Goods, 
International Experience 
5+ Middle Management,  
Market Research 
14 Fast Moving 
Consumer Goods 
Low Unilever Client Fast Moving Consumer Goods 20+ Middle Management, New 
Business Development 
8 Real Estate - JLL Provider and 
client 
Real Estate, International Experience 10+ Advisor 
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Antecedent 1980s early 1990s late 1990s early 2000s late 2000s early 2010s 
IBM (low) Victim of 
foreign 
“moles” in 




















Gerstner sets up a 
squad of CI teams, led 
by senior executives 
as customer experts; 
growing diversity in 
cross-functional CI 
team; diffusion of best 
practice by hiring 
former CIA veteran as 
CI consultant, J. 
Herring (see TI, 
Motorola); virtual CI 
teams  
1998: standard CI on rivals` 
products prior to launch, discount, 
sales pitches; CI`s "human 
intelligence network; growing 
diversification of targets 
competitors' clients,  consultants, 
suppliers, and rivals` young 
engineers; seeks patterns in 
fragmented data (Big Data); 
technological standardisation with 
net-based technologies; known as 
“eagle” (leading CI firm); Herring 
and Gilad, a CI consultant to IBM 
and P&G found Academy of CI 
2000: Includes CI as a part of 
corporate strategy; 2001: one 
of leading three users of CI; 
rise of  standardisation 
formalisation; 2005: More 
centralisation; officer 
responsible for CI per region; 
formal CI training for 
employees; CI focus on 
competitors and prevention of 
reputational damage; IBM 
widely known as exemplar if 
best practice; Herring and 
Gilad merge training 








studied as best 
practice and as 
major player in 
CI software 
After acquiring Cognos, 
leading player that benefits 
from rising importance of 
specialisation in analytics; 
key player in package 
software and licenses for CI 
(e.g. Big Data); ranked as 
top US corporate CI user; 
seen as best practice and CI 
target, identified as the 
company with largest 
number of business lines 













trends to spot 
opportunities 
 1996: LT sued by Maxim 
Integrated Products for theft of 
trade secrets (posing as 
customer) ; Damage control: 
settles dispute out of court; 1998: 
rise in scale/scope; CI units 
within R&D analyse end-user 
trends; adhering to standard CI 
practice 
2000: adhering to standard 
practice, CI for alerts on 
trends: e.g. portability, 
connectivity, processing 
power; LT changed direction 
to focus on power usage and 
battery life; R&D, marketing  
share intelligence across units 
(diversity of users and 
producers) 














Table 2.2: Company Cases and CI Development (Microsoft and Motorola) 
Company 
(CI relatedness) 
Antecedent 1980s early 1990s late 1990s early 2000s late 2000s early 2010s 
Microsoft 
(low) 
 1987: Top 
management 
involved; New 
marketing VP focuses 












CEO dedicates time to 
CI, creates feedback 
loop driving priorities, 
increases scale/scope; 
spends more on CI 
related IT/services; 
increases the diversity 
of CI users/producers; 
firm known as “eagle”, 
i.e. leading CI firm; 
standardisation with 
net-based technologies 
2000: Adopts CI Dashboard standard for 
executives ; external experts and CI staff 
actively gather CI; 2001: Named as leading 
user of CI; 2002: Victim of transgressive 
dumpster diving; found to support interest 
groups; damage control by settling dispute out 
of court; 2004: transgression by employees` 
under cover activities at competitor`s 
convention; damage control by policy changes; 
ranked as one of the most searched companies 
online; success viewed as cause for turning into 
target for security breaches and attacks such as 
hacking, phishing; former leaders of CI leave 
and start CI focused firms 
Invests in CI related 
software as core; 
acquires CI related 
firms  in advanced 
B2B applications 
space; best practice 
case in CI books by 
leading CI authors 
(Fuld); listed as 
































CEO, top team 
driving; industry's 
first formal CI 
programs; CEO 
recruits 20 year 
veteran CIA officer J. 
Herring in 1982 (see 
TI, IBM); CI expert in 
each of five divisions; 
tech-focussed CI unit; 
10 people at corporate 
level, $1m budget; 




with own CI unit; 
technology CI for 
Iridium project 
 1995: Increasing scale 
and scope; Broadens 
focus to include outside 




market, industry); needs 
identification process  
1998: IT a multiplier for 
CI; acknowledged as 
“eagle” leading CI 
company; prominent CI 
leaders Herring and 
Gilad, a CI consultant 
also to IBM and P&G 
found Academy of CI 
2000: Develops a professional human-source 
intelligence collection operation to tap brains of 
90,000 employees worldwide (high diversity of 
users and producers of CI);  2001: Among the 
leading five users of CI across industries (high 
degree of formalisation by benchmarking); 
2004: Enterprise Roadmap Management 
System; roadmap library for collaborative 
sharing; Motorola widely acknowledged as 
pioneer of CI and best practice; well known for 
CI capabilities; case study in best practice 
studies; Robert Galvin acclaimed as driver 
behind CI; former leaders of CI leave and 
establish CI focused companies; seen as virtual 
organisation prone to rely on subcontracting 
and IT both increasing likelihood of security 
breaches; Herring and Gilad merge training 
organisation with other CI consultant, L. Fuld,  
Motorola widely 
acknowledged as 
pioneer of CI and 
best practice; 
former Motorola CI 














Antecedent 1980s early 1990s late 1990s early 2000s late 2000s early 2010s 
P&G (low) Increasing 
speed of 
change;  





















6 month cycles 
common CI 
practice; adoption 
of best practice by 
hiring of leading 
professionals; Ex-
FBI officer leads 
security, regular 





trips to protect 
secrets;  
1993: CI led by 
Steinhardt (until 
2000) 
Top management involved; 
acknowledged as “eagle”, i.e. 
leading CI company; CEO 
support for CI; Global 
Knowledge Network (digital 
Hub & Spoke); 
standardisation with net-based 
technologies; increase of 
scale and scope; dynamic 
modelling of competition; 
Intranet; CI training; CI part 
of strategic planning process; 
former CEO (initiator of CI at 
Motorola) joins board; 
diffusion of best practices; CI 
uses safe house and a head 
office (known as 'the ranch' 
and 'Kremlin'); limits official 
contacts outside of firm; 
prominent CI leaders Herring 
and Gilad, a consultant to 
P&G and IBM found 
Academy of CI 
Sourcing of global CI portal; Top 
management involved; in 2000 Chairman, ex-
CEO J. Pepper (1999) states CI should be 
embedded in the formal strategic process and 
a standard process at all levels; boost to 
diversity of users and producers of CI; 
transgression and reputation damage after 
P&G revealed that its CI contractors had 
spied on Unilever’s hair-care unit; damage 
control by immediate departure of three 
executives directly involved; settles dispute 
out of court in 2001 for $10 m; P&G one of 
five top users of CI; formalisation and 
standardisation increase as former P&G 
executive becomes CEO of key competitor; 
company standards forbid employees/ 
suppliers to work on laptops on planes to 
avoid leaks; P&G well known for CI 
capabilities; Herring and Gilad merge training 









be a leading 
company;  


















dispute out of 
court  
 CI deploys patent 
tracking 
Widespread CI training to 
collect and to protect 
intelligence 
Random checks on internal security (actors  
infiltrate employees` groups and identify 
leaks); policies forbid employees or 
employees of suppliers to work on laptops in 
airplanes to limit  espionage risk; CEO of 
Unilever is former P&G employee and holder 












Table 2.4: Company Cases and CI Development (Intel, Oracle and Texas Instruments and Unisys) 
Company 
(CI relatedness) 

























1996: Hires ex CIA officers,  
experts in disinformation; agencies` 
as model (see IBM, TI, Motorola);  
primary data; aims at best practice; 
known “eagle”, savviest US CI 
firm; rising CI scale/ scope; 
formalized, diverse CI people   
Top team involved; A. 
Grove, CEO integrates 
KM/CI in “dashboard”; 
formalized  contents; net-
based standards ; among 
most searched firms 
online; known as best 
practice, sponsor/ 
promoter of CI 
known as best practice with 




and capacity of large 
















for best practice  
Reward systems to incentivise 
internal diffusion of CI through 
sharing of customer and competitor 
information across different units 
(growing diversification of users 
and producers of CI)  
2002: Contractor 
transgressive (dives 
dumpster at Microsoft 
affiliate);  executive 
departure; reputation/ 
share price hurt; damage 
control: out of court 
settlement 
Corporate CI; integrates 
databases; standards, net-
based; one of the most 
searched firms online;  invests 
in CI software as mainstream; 
acquires CI related firms in 
advanced software; major 
player: CI enterprise software 
Known as mayor 
player exploiting 
rising importance of 
specialised software 
for analytics; remains 
leading player in 
packages,  licenses for 




















CI scale/scope grows; crosses 
depts.; central CI unit; for all 
compulsory training; diverse CI 
producers/ users; Key CI Topics 
(Herring, 1996; 1999), US Gov. 
best practice (see IBM, Intel, 
Motorola); Herring joins Gilad, 
P&G, IBM advisor, to found 
Academy of CI; CI prepares M&A 
CI efforts acknowledged 
as effective best practice 
to avert disadvantage; 
Herring and Gilad merge 
training organisation with 
that of CI consultant Fuld 
Acknowledged as best 
practices in CI by  













1994: CI shifts 
from technology 
to customer 
focus; CI units 





cross section CI 
sessions; focus 
on CI standards 
1999: Establishes centralised 
intelligence unit, as staff function; 
standardisation of approach;  input 
for new leadership team’s strategic 
planning processes 
2004: CI for communities 
with common purpose;  
diverse CI  producers/ 
users; professional CI 
capabilities/motivation 
grown; knowledge, best 
practice sharing; partners 
with software provider to 
offer standardized CI 
related solutions; strategic 
alliance with CIA funded 
intelligence firm  
Internal search for CI best 
practices; award for CI 
practices to share insights; CI 
as (part of) customised 
service and consulting 
Global player in 
security industry  
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Linear Technology  
(low) 
Microsoft   
(low) 
Motorola   
(low) 
Procter & Gamble   
(low) 
Unilever   
(low) 
Antecedents · Victim of espionage  
· Settled out of court 
· CI scandal 
· Settled out of court 
· CI scandal 
· Settled out of court 
· CEO insider of US CI 
community 
· Victim of espionage; CI scandal 
· Settled out of court  
· Victim of espionage 
· Settled out of court 
Main 
developments 
· Known for adopting CI best 
practice 
· Develops CI business 
· Known for 
adopting CI best 
practice 
· Known for adopting CI 
best practice 
· Develops CI business  
· Pioneers CI best 
practice 
 
· Known for adopting CI best 
practice 
 
· Known for adopting 
CI best practice 
Main periods · 1990s   
· Late 2000s (CI solutions for 
analytics/Big Data) 
· Late 1990s  
  
· 1990s  
· Late 2000s (CI solutions 
for analytics/Big Data) 
· 1980s  
 
· 1990s 
· Early 2000s 
· Early 2000s  
 
Actors · CEO as initiator 
· Top management involved 
· Hires secret service veterans 
as experts; introduces 
standard CI practices 
(Herring 1996; 1999),  
· CI units in R&D  · COO (CEO, President)  
Involvement  
· Hires CI experts; 
introduces standard CI 
practices 
· Decentralised CI units 
· CEO as initiator 
· Hires generations of 
secret service veterans 
(e.g. CIA) to lead CI 
who standardize CI 
practices (Herring 
1996; 1999) 
· CEO involvement  
· Executives/former employees of 
competitors 
· Former Motorola CEO, pioneer 
of CI, joins P&G board 
· Hires secret service veterans 
(e.g. FBI) who standardize CI 
practices 
· Top management 
involved 
· CEO/executives 




· Focus on tech, R&D, rivals’ 
new product launches extend 
to customers 
· Teams led by key executives 
· Emphasis on integration of 
IT, human CI network 
· CI part of strategic planning 
· common training/practices  
to protect CI and reputation  
· Focus on 
technology patents 
grows to include 
consumer trends 
 · Seek opportunities 
through CI  
· Alert other units 
· Sharing of CI 
· Customer focus 
· Combining low-high tech 
· Executives centralise CI  
· CI (alliance ,newsgroups) 
· Feedback from customers  
by, e.g. executives in field 
· IT facilitates (networking,  
portals, dashboards) 
· Focus on technology  
expands to broader  
environment 
· Emphasis of IT in CI 
· Human-source CI 
collection 
· Process of 
Management Needs  
Identification  
· Focus on consumers and 
solutions extends to competitors 
· training to collect/protect 
intelligence, protect reputation 
· Sharing of CI via central CI unit 
· CI part of day-to-day  
purchasing  
· CI efforts cover partners, rivals, 
suppliers and employees  
·  training to collect/ 
protect intelligence, 
protect reputation 
· Patent tracking 
· Policies to protect CI 
· Random  security/ 
scrutiny checks  of 
employees 
Structures · Central unit with key 
executives leading 
decentralised efforts 
· Culture and team based 
· Sub-unit of R&D 
department   
· Decentralised structure 
· CI units directly linked to 
heads of departments and 
executives 
· First corporate CI unit 
with dedicated people 
 
· Corporate CI unit 
· Hub & spoke (real and virtual) 
· CI uses contractors and external 
locales ('the ranch', 'Kremlin') 
· Decentralised, 
consensus-style 
Key similarities  · Develops standard CI 
· Sees CI as inevitable  
· Keeps low visibility of CI  
· Supplies CI solutions  
· Develops standard 
CI 
· Keeps low 
visibility of CI 
· Develops standard CI 
· Sees CI as inevitable  
· Keeps low visibility of CI 
· Supplies CI related 
solutions 
· Pioneers standard CI 
practice 
· Sees CI as inevitable  
· Keeps low visibility of 
CI  
· Develops standard CI 
· Sees CI as inevitable  
· Keeps low visibility of CI 
· Develops standard 
CI 
· Sees CI as inevitable 
· Keeps low visibility 
of CI  
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Antecedents · Japanese competition  
· Settled out of court 
· CI scandal 
· Settled out of court 
· Victim of espionage 
· Settled out of court 
 
Main developments · Known for adopting CI best practice 
· Develops as supplier to CI industry 
· Known for adopting CI best 
practice 
· Develops CI business 
· Known for adopting CI best practice 
 
· Known for adopting CI best practice 
· Develops CI business 
Main periods · 1980s   
· Early 2000s (develops position as 
supplier to CI related industries) 
· 1990s  
· Late 2000s (CI solutions for 
analytics/Big Data) 
· Late 1990s · 1990s  
· Early 2000s (develops CI products and 
solutions as part of security industry) 
Actors · CEO as initiator 
· Hires secret services veterans as 
experts; introduces standard CI 
practices  
· CI department led by ex-CIA officer 
· CEO involvement, emphasis 
on customer feedback 
· CI function  
· CEO as promoter  
· Hires generations of secret service 
veterans (e.g. CIA) to lead CI who 
standardize CI practices (Herring) 
· CI from within R&D and tech focus to 
firm 
· CEO changes focus of CI 
· Business unit R&D CI staff 
· CI from internal focus  on R&D and 
tech to focus to support corporate 
strategy process    
Practices & processes · Focus on monitoring of rivals’ 
R&D, technology expands to 
include clients  
· Increasing centralisation 
· Intelligence sharing  
· Integrating CI processes 
· Fact based decisions  
· Focus on technology/ markets 
expands to clients/ rivals 
· Increasing centralisation 
· Incentives to share CI  
· Intelligence sharing 
· Continuous feedback from 
customer contact  
· Intranet for sharing 
· Focus on technology and R&D 
expands to market and rivals 
· Increasing centralisation 
· Increases incentives for cross unit 
sharing of CI 
· Introduces formal CI training 
· Structured CI processes 
· System support 
· Focus on rivals’ technology expands 
to customers 
· Increasing centralisation 
· Increasing focus on online threat 
· Develops communities of practice for 
knowledge sharing 
· Acquisition of key supplier to US CI 
community  
Structures · Multiple CI units 
· CI for strategic planning 
· Dashboard environment  
· Established in R&D  
· Later centralised CI function 
and database 
· Establishes CI within R&D  
· Strategy Leadership Team creates 
central CI  
· Establishes central CI unit  
· Strategic alliance with government  
funded (CIA) intelligence firm  
Key similarities  · Develops standard CI  
· Sees CI as inevitable  
· Keeps low visibility of CI  
· Supplies CI providers 
· Develops standard CI 
· Sees CI as inevitable  
· Keeps low visibility of CI unit  
· Supplies CI related solutions  
· Develops standard CI  
· Keeps low visibility of CI unit 
· Develops standard CI 
· Keeps low visibility of CI unit  





Table 4.1: Factors of Persistence 
Abstraction from Raw Data  Categories and Themes  Key Concepts 
 
Victim of industrial espionage.  Surprise with negative outcomes (speed of 
change, digitalisation, crisis). CEO insider to Intelligence Community. Key 
external professionals hired or involved (e.g., J. Herring, CIA (1996; 
1999)). Intelligence function established. External experts actively gather 
information globally. Focus on experts’ processes, tools. Sophisticated (IT) 




Increasing scope of practice (serving more disciplines; corporate level). 
CEO/Chairman /new executives emphasise key role of CI for corporate 
strategy. CEO establishes CI (e.g., set up squad of CI teams led by senior 
executives with professional support by same/similar experts, integrates 
Knowledge Management, intelligence processes and technology). CI 
training (compulsory) for all employees to enhance professional 
capabilities. Cross unit sharing of customer and competitor information. 
Gathering and analysing intelligence on targeted market segments. Focus 
on competitors’ R&D expands to include broader environment. R&D and 
marketing work closely together and share intelligence. Supports corporate 
strategy process, decision making and sales force. Communities of 
practices and reward systems to motivate employees to conduct CI 
activities.  
 
Emergence (antecedents of 
adoption) 
Trauma of victimisation (through 
transgression by others). Surprise by 
crisis. Aiming for best practice (i.e., 





Increasing scale and scope 
Commitment of senior executives 
Expertise and the adoption of 
professional tools to fulfil perceived 
needs (e.g., revenge, protection, 
survival, competitive advantage). 
Direct involvement of top 






Perception of existing best 
practice as better kept 
secret. Simplicity (e.g., 
dumpster diving). Lack of 
transparency (even for 
internal CI experts). 
Demand for non-
observability (ability to 
keep the practice under the 
radar). Professional 
behavioural routines and 
professional skills lead to 




Table 4.2: Factors of Persistence 
Abstractions from Raw Data Categories and Themes  Key Concepts 
 
 
Led from corporate level. Focus on Key Intelligence Topics (modelled on 
US Government’s approach). Professionalization (“best practices”). 
Specialisation (within corporation or departments). From decentralisation 
to centralised structure.  Integration of separated databases. IT a multiplier 
for CI (e.g. Dynamic modelling of competition). Key analytical group with 
diverse members. Cross-functional teams. Professional intelligence 
network. Establishment of professional body to support the CI profession. 
Development of professional code of conduct. Broad anticipation of threats. 
Key CI consultants, Herring (formerly CIA) and Gilad, join forces in late 
1990s and merge with Fuld to form Academy of Competitive Intelligence 
 
 
Violations and victimisation. Scandals and law suits. Actors infiltrate 
competitors and focal company teams and departments to identify leaks. 
Targeting competitors' consultants, suppliers, customers and employees. 
Surveillance, “regular inspections”, by security department teams lead by 
former FBI agent. Zealous, regular and random checks of internal security 




Careers in CI. CI advisors, consultants and professionals. Moving from 
public to private intelligence functions. Internal CI career ladder. Part-time 
CI careers. Routinized reactions to scandals. Scapegoating. Personnel 




Formalisation and Standardisation 
Standardisation across industry, 
Competitive parity, firm-level 




Transgressions and Reputational 
Damage 
Covert activities may go unnoticed 
(embarrassment for victims)  
Transgressions can lead to a scandals 
(shaming of perpetrators) 
 
 
Diversification and Damage Control 
Growing numbers and diversity in CI 
community. Differentiation. Scandals 
and transgressions resolved quietly 
backstage. Few cases brought forward 




and Invoking Fear 
Leveraging strong beliefs 
about the need for CI. 
Motivating specific CI 







that seeks association of CI 
practice with what is 
legitimate and dissociation 
with what is not. 
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i Penenberg and Barry (2000) speak of the “Intelligencing of Corporate America” and Warrell and O’Murchu 
(2013), and Evans (2013) report on many blue chips among more than 100 companies in the City of London that 
deploy CI practices. 
ii A former Vice President at Lancome and L’Oreal emphasises the non-rational, intuitive dimension of CI and the 
difficulties of gauging its effectiveness (Salmon and de Linares 1999).  
iii Estimates of the size of the CI market range from US$1-2 billion a year worldwide. Over 25% of the 520 CI 
practitioners worldwide (Competitive Intelligence Foundation, 2006) said their company’s total CI spending in 
2000 surpassed $100,000, and 14% said their company spent over $500,000 on CI or CI-related activities (Calof 
and Wright, 2008). One benchmarking report found the average CI operating budget of more than twenty firms 
to be $821,613 with large variance (Business Wire, 2006). Overall, Firms engaging in CI spend on average 1% 
of their revenue on CI (Pfaff, 2005).  
iv A search in Google reveals the lack of information on CI. For example, searching for company “IBM” together 
with “marketing” (“accounting”; “logistics”) generates 124 (46; 16) million hits. The joint results for  
“competitive intelligence” amount only to 2 million hits. While many academic journals are dedicated to 
marketing, logistics, or accounting, few are dedicated to competitive intelligence. 
v While we relied for the selection on databases and specifically the Wall Street Journal, we broadened our 
sources to get a richer picture of CI in relation to the companies. We included data from (1) newspapers (e.g., 
Wall Street Journal, New York Times); (2) magazines (e.g., Business Week, Fortune, Forbes, Harvard Business 
Review, Journal of Business Strategy, Journal of Information Security, Journal of Marketing Intelligence and 
Planning, Strategy & Leadership); (3) trade journals (e.g., Advertising Age, Chief Executive, Computerworld, 
Electronic Business, International Business, Management Services, Marketing Tools, Research Technology 
Management, Review of Business and Technology, Software Magazine); (4) archival company data, such as 
annual reports and press releases available through online company databases and websites; (5) professional 
literature on CI; (6) conversations with practitioners and professionals. 
vi We are grateful to the editor and reviewer’s guidance to extend the period of observation.  
vii After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a large number of CI professionals appeared on the job market, which 
made finding experienced talent easier than during times of high governmental demand for such expertise. 
viii For additional interview quotes on CI’ emergence, diffusion and persistence and Practice Persistence see 
Appendix 3. 
ix The Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP) founded by a leading CI consultant seeks to 
enhance “the success of our members through leadership, education, advocacy, and networking” (www.scip.org) 
and provides a code of conduct that excludes any activities that might cause scandals. 
x A controversial “employee-retention effort” “inside the CIA allows serving officers to moonlight in the private 
sector during their off hours” (Houston et al., 2012). 
